Abstract. This paper aims to provide foundations for games with unawareness by constructing a universal type space for beliefs and propositional unawareness, which nests the universal belief type space of Mertens and Zamir (1985) . The type spaces are purely measurable, with no topological structure, but a topology can easily be added. Unawareness of agents and higher-order reasoning permits a similar construction of a universal type space as propositional unawareness.
Introduction
Several types of uncertainty have been studied in economics, logic and artificial intelligence: risk, ambiguity, unawareness and self-aware unawareness. With risk, there is a well-defined probability distribution over outcomes, while with ambiguity there is only a set of probabilities or a more general probability-like operator. Under risk and ambiguity the agent knows that he does not know and what he does not know, while under unawareness the agent knows neither. Under self-aware unawareness the agent knows that there exists something he does not know, but does not know what it is.
Usually only one type of uncertainty is described in a given model, with risk being the most frequently used due to the mathematical simplicity of modelling risk with a probability distribution. Of models using more than one type of uncertainty, captures unawareness and self-aware unawareness. Since risk is a special case of ambiguity (a singleton set of probabilities), the models of ambiguity really contain two kinds of uncertainty. Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) and Schipper (2010) put probability and unawareness in the same model.
Apart from being philosophically interesting, uncertainty is studied because of its effect on decisions. Choice under unawareness may exhibit 'reverse Bayesianism', i.e. updating may lead an initially null event to receive positive weight in decisions (Karni and Vierø, 2010) , so unawareness can modify behaviour in ways not explainable by risk or ambiguity. The experiment of Mengel, Tsakas, and Vostroknutov (2011) shows that after being exposed to unawareness, behaviour differs from that after risk or ambiguity.
The set of extensive-form rationalizable strategies can differ between a game where a player is unaware of an action and the same game with the player putting zero probability on the action (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2011) . Furthermore, games with unawareness cannot be mapped in a uniform manner into incomplete information games, since in standard extensive-form games the set of nodes where a player considers a given set of nodes possible is identical with the set of nodes considered possible, while this may not be the case in games with unawareness (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2011) . Therefore games with unawareness are not just a special case of standard games and merit separate study.
There are now a number of papers on games with unawareness (Feinberg, 2009; Grant and Quiggin, 2009; Halpern, 2008; Rêgo and Halpern, 2007) , but a common framework is lacking. For probabilistic beliefs in standard games, such a framework is provided by the universal type spaces of Mertens and Zamir (1985) ; Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) . These papers proved the existence of a universal space of belief hierarchies, into which all type spaces can be uniquely mapped. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) obtained a similar universality result for conditional beliefs, Ahn (2007) for ambiguous beliefs and Kets (2010) for uncertainty about agents' depth of reasoning.
On the other hand, if the agents' epistemic state is described by knowledge operators instead of probabilities, there is no universal space (Heifetz and Samet, 1998a) . This result can be circumvented under additional assumptions on knowledge (Mariotti, Meier, and Piccione, 2005) . Since universal spaces can be constructed for some types of uncertainty, but not for others, the question arises whether unawareness precludes a universal space.
This paper describes a universal type space with beliefs and propositional unawareness, which provides a unified foundation to games with that kind of unawareness. Just like the existence of a universal belief type space shows that there is no loss of generality in replacing hierarchical descriptions of beliefs of all orders by types, a universal space of beliefs and awareness means there is no loss of generality in using belief and awareness types (each type has an awareness level and a belief over the types). Applications include no-trade theorems (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2009) , axiomatizing solution concepts in games with unawareness, studying common awareness, common certainty, and robustness of equilibrium concepts.
Any model with unawareness has to address the impossibility result of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) that standard state spaces preclude unawareness. Given natural properties of knowledge and unawareness, their result rests on two basic axioms. The first axiom (real states) requires the negation and conjunction operators to behave in the standard way and the second (event sufficiency) requires the operators for knowledge and awareness to take events to events. Knowledge and awareness of a statement cannot depend on other factors, such as the syntactic form of the statement. As pointed out by Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006); Schipper (2011) , one of these axioms must be relaxed to model nontrivial unawareness. Economics models usually relax real states, while the logic literature mostly forgoes event sufficiency. This paper follows the economics literature in omitting the real states axiom and keeping event sufficiency. This means negation and disjunction are nonstandard, but awareness depends just on the set of states belonging to an event, not on how the event is constructed or expressed. Section 4 shows that the desirable properties of knowledge (here taken to be belief with probability one) and awareness listed in Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) hold in the model of this paper, and section 3 shows awareness is nontrivial. Therefore the universal type space with unawareness bypasses the impossibility result.
The next section proves the existence of a universal type space with unawareness and shows how it may be unpacked into hierarchies of belief and awareness. Section 3 describes the events in the model and the belief and awareness operators. The connection to Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) is described in section 4 and the link to Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) is provided in section 5.
The existence of universal type spaces with unawareness
In this section, propositional unawareness is added to the universal space of belief hierarchies of Heifetz and Samet (1998b) . Propositional unawareness is mentioned in the early paper of Fagin and Halpern (1988) and is the most common kind of unawareness used in the literature (Modica and Rustichini, 1999; Halpern, 2001; Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2006; Halpern and Rêgo, 2008; Li, 2009) . It is the main kind used in this paper, though other kinds of unawareness are possible in the model defined below-the last section of the paper describes the possible extensions.
The construction of Heifetz and Samet (1998b) is chosen as the basic framework, because unlike the earlier belief hierarchies of Mertens and Zamir (1985) ; Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) , it has no topological structure and only uses measurability assumptions. Topological structure can easily be added, but the topology of the type space is not a necessary or natural component of descriptions of beliefs, as argued in Heifetz and Samet (1998b) . The Polish space version of the universal type space does not contain all probability measures over itself and is a strict subset of the purely measurable case (Pintér, 2010) , therefore is less general.
For propositional unawareness, the existence of the universal type space is a special case of (Moss and Viglizzo, 2006, Theorem 6.4) or (Viglizzo, 2005, Theorem 7.1) . If topological structure is added, the universality results are a subcase of Doberkat and Schubert (2011) .
2.1. Notation. Fix for the rest of the paper a measurable space S as the set of states of nature and a finite set I as the set of agents. For each fixed set of states of nature, agents and awareness levels, a universal type space with unawareness is constructed. There is no universal type space that encompasses all sets of states of nature, agents or awareness levels.
Before defining the universal type space and proving its existence, some notation is needed. Let denote disjoint union. The power set of X is PX and the complement of E is E c . Nature is treated notationally as agent 0 and
For a measurable space X, denote by Σ(X) its σ-algebra and by ∆(X) the set of probability measures over X, endowed with the σ-algebra generated by
As usual, δ x denotes the Dirac delta function on x, i.e. the probability distribution concentrated on x.
The product of a vector of measurable spaces (X i ) i∈I0 is × i∈I0 X i = X and the product of all spaces except i in the vector is × j∈I0\{i} X i = X −i . A similar convention applies to collections of measurable spaces with more than one index (X Ψ,i ) i∈I0 Ψ⊆Φ . The product over one index keeps the other index, X i = × Ψ⊆Φ X Ψ,i , and the product over both indexes drops both, X = × Ψ⊆Φ, i∈I0 X Ψ,i . Abusing notation, the collection (X Ψ,i ) i∈I0 Ψ⊆Φ may also be denoted X. Products of measurable spaces have the product σ-algebra.
With propositional unawareness, the set of awareness levels is isomorphic to PΦ, the power set of a set of propositions Φ. If the universal type space is expressed in the modal logic framework, Φ will be the set of propositions from which the language of the logic is constructed. In the set-based model, PΦ indexes a set of σ-algebras on S, and also the components of type spaces that contain different awareness information. The trivial σ-algebra is
, where ∨ denotes the coarsest common refinement (the join) of the σ-algebras. The Σ Ψ (S) form a boolean algebra (a set lattice). For each Ψ ⊆ Φ, the set S with the σ-algebra Σ Ψ (S) is denoted S Ψ .
2.2. Definitions and existence. The definitions of type spaces with unawareness, type morphisms and the universal type space with unawareness are presented next, followed by the existence proof. Type spaces with belief and awareness are defined the same way here as in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) 
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, since both papers extend the construction of Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) to the probabilistic case.
is a measurable space for each Ψ and i, and M Ψ,0 = S Ψ for each Ψ, (ii) for each Ψ and i, the type function g Ψ,i :
The type function g i for agent i consists of all the g Ψ,i . For ease of notation, g i may be written as mapping M to ∆(M −i ), with the understanding that g i only depends on the i-th coordinate of its argument.
For t ∈ M Ψ for some Ψ, the support supp g i (t) of g i (t) is a subset of S Ξ × M Ξ,−i for some Ξ ⊆ Ψ, so compared to the space of t, it is missing the dimension M Ξ,i . To obtain higher order belief, g i must be iterated, so g i (t) is implicitly extended to the missing dimension in a way that ensures the agent is certain of his beliefs modulo awareness, g i (t) ∈ ∆(S Ξ × M Ξ,−i ) × δ tΞ,i . The own type t Ξ,i that t i is certain of is the natural projection of t i to t i 's awareness level Ξ, meaning g i (t i ) = g i (t Ξ,i ). This is well defined if there are no redundant types (different types that have identical beliefs). With redundancy, pick any type that has the appropriate belief.
To connect type spaces with unawareness to each other, type morphisms are needed. These are maps from one type space to another that preserve belief and awareness information.
. A type morphism φ is an isomorphism if it is a measure-preserving bijection between M and M , i.e. φ −1 : M → M is a measurable function and µ (φ(E )) = µ(E)
The definition of a universal type space is standard-it is a type space containing all other type spaces.
Definition 3. A type space with awareness (Ω, g) is universal if for every type space (M , g ) with the same set of agents I, awareness levels PΦ and states of nature S there is a unique type morphism from (M , g ) to (Ω, g).
The existence and uniqueness of a universal type space for propositional unawareness is proved in Theorem 1. The proof in the appendix translates the problem into category theory and uses the general result of Viglizzo (2005) . Theorem 1. For fixed sets of states of nature S, agents I and awareness levels PΦ, there exists a universal type space with propositional unawareness (Ω, g) unique up to isomorphism. In (Ω, g), the type function g is an isomorphism.
For all type spaces with the sets of states of nature, agents or awareness levels being S ⊆ S, I ⊆ I and PΦ ⊆ PΦ respectively, the universal type space for S, I and PΦ is weak-universal, meaning a type morphism into it exists, but is not unique. In particular, a universal type space for S , I and PΦ can be embedded in the universal space for S, I and PΦ. The embedding is nonunique if labels of states, agents or awareness levels can be changed, e.g. agent 1 in a type space with I = {1} can be mapped to either agent 1 or 2 in a type space with I = {1, 2}. If labels must be preserved, the embedding is unique, but may not exist when intuitively it should: a type space with I = {1, 2} cannot be embedded in a space with I = {2, 3} or vice versa while preserving labels.
2.3. Belief hierarchies with unawareness. Two proofs of the existence of universal spaces are given in Viglizzo (2005) -one constructs the spaces so that a type equals the set of all events which contain the type, the other shows that a subset of the set of all hierarchies is a universal type space. Section 2 showed that the universal type space with unawareness exists, while section 3 will describe the events in the universal space and connect a type to the events containing it. This subsection unpacks types into hierarchies of belief and awareness.
First the set of all hierarchies is defined and then the function from types to hierarchies is given. The construction is similar to Heifetz and Samet (1998b) . The base case of the inductive construction of hierarchies of belief and awareness is setting H 0 Ψ,i to be a singleton for all i ∈ I and Ψ ⊆ Φ, and setting H k Ψ,0 = S Ψ for all k ≥ 0 and all Ψ ⊆ Φ. The inductive step is to define for all k ≥ 0, i = 0
The set of infinite hierarchies is
. This completes the construction of h. The definition of h did not depend on Ω being universal. The same construction can be used for any type space with unawareness, and one way to define the universal space is as those elements of H to which some type in some type space with unawareness is mapped by the h defined on that type space. This is one of the two constructive proofs of the existence of the universal space in Viglizzo (2005) .
Events, belief and awareness
In this section, the form and properties of events are described, where events are those subsets of Ω that the agents can reason about. Events take the form of a subset of one of the components of the universal space together with all the inverse projections of that subset into components with more awareness. This construction follows Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) in building unawareness into the structure of the space. A formal connection to the model of Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper is demonstrated in section 5.
The next subsection defines set operations, belief and awareness in the universal type space with unawareness.
3.1. Conjunction, negation and epistemic operators. The universal type space with unawareness Ω = (Ω Ψ,i ) Ψ⊆Φ i∈I0 can be divided into layers Ω Ψ = × i∈I0 Ω Ψ,i , one for each awareness level Ψ ⊆ Φ. There is a different empty set ∅ Ψ associated with each Ω Ψ . Events are the disjoint unions of nonempty sets of measurable sets, at most one set per layer. Their form is E = Ψ∈ζ E Ψ for some nonempty ζ ⊆ PΦ, where E Ψ ∈ Σ(Ω Ψ ) is called the Ψ-section of E. Not every such set of measurable sets is an event-the restrictions on events are given below. The operators for conjunction, negation, awareness and belief are defined next, without restricting sets of measurable sets to be events.
The conjunction of sets
. It satisfies ¬¬E = E, but is not equal to the complement of E in Ω. The nonstandard negation is what allows the present model to bypass the Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) impossibility result stating that standard state spaces preclude unawareness. This is discussed in more detail in subsection 4.
Disjunction of sets is defined from conjunction and negation via De Morgan's laws: E ∨ F = ¬(¬E ∧ ¬F ). Equality of sets E and F requires ζ = χ and E Ξ = F Ξ for each Ξ ∈ ζ. Set E implies F (is a subset of F ), written as E ⇒ F if ζ = χ and E Ξ ⊆ F Ξ for each Ξ ∈ ζ. Equality and implication respect the usual propositional tautologies: E = F is the same as E ∧ F ∨ ¬E ∧ ¬F , and E ⇒ F is the same as ¬E ∨ F .
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The set B i r E in which agent i puts probability at least r on E consists of measurable sets from the layers Ω Ξ that contain more awareness than some layer in which E has a section. For each Ξ that is a superset of some Ψ ∈ ζ, the Ξ-section of B i r E is made up of those types in Ω Ξ that put probability at least r on some section of E. Formally,
The event in which agent i is aware of E is
Remark 1. Three observations following directly from the definitions are (1)
2 An alternative definition of implication is: E⇒F iff ζ ⊆ χ and E Ξ ⊆ F Ξ for each Ξ ∈ ζ. This follows the intuition of the subset relation. E⇒F is not equal to ¬E ∨ F , but E⇒F ∧ F⇒E is the same as E = F . Since⇒ is weaker than ⇒, all the results for ⇒ below continue to hold for⇒.
In the universal type space, the events A i E and B i r E contain a measurable set from each Ω Ξ for which Ξ ⊇ Ψ for some Ψ ∈ ζ, because each layer of the universal space contains a belief with support in each layer with less awareness. If the Ψ-section of E is nonempty, then the Ξ-sections of A i E and B i r E are also nonempty, because each layer of the universal space contains all beliefs over layers with weakly less awareness, i.e. layer Ω Ψ contains for any nonempty set E Ξ with Ξ ⊆ Ψ a type putting probability one on E Ξ . Probability one implies probability at least r for any r ∈ [0, 1] by Remark 1.
Unawareness is nontrivial in this paper, because if E does not contain a measurable set from each layer of Ω (ζ = PΦ), then there exists a type t with supp g i (t) ⊆ Ω Ξ and Ξ / ∈ ζ. That type is unaware of set E, so ¬A i E is nonempty. Since ζ must be nonempty, A i E contains a measurable set from at least one layer of Ω. If E contains at least one nonempty set, then at least one measurable set in A i E is nonempty. Unlike in Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) , unawareness is generally neither the whole space nor the empty set, and the same holds for belief.
3.2. Properties of belief and awareness. This subsection characterizes belief and awareness in type spaces with unawareness in more detail. First it is shown that belief with probability one and awareness satisfy the conjunction property-the conjunction of sets is certain iff both sets are certain and the agent is aware of the conjunction of events iff he is aware of both. The proof is purely from the definitions.
Belief with probability r ∈ (0, 1) does not satisfy conjunction. An easy counterexample is the uniform distribution on {a, b, c} which puts probability at least 2 3 on both {a, b} and {b, c}, but not on {b}. Probabilistic belief does satisfy two conjunction-like properties similar to those given in Samet (2000) and Zhou (2009) . These are
r+q E, r + q ≤ 1. Awareness needs to be added to make all sets consist of sections from the same layers of Ω.
Subsequently only sets of measurable sets of the form E = Ψ⊇Ξ E Ψ are considered, where Ξ can be any subset of Φ. Events satisfy this restriction. The definition of events is inductive. The base case is to take for any measurable set of states of nature F S ∈ Σ(S) the coarsest Σ Ξ (S) in which F S is measurable and let F = Ψ⊇Ξ F Ψ , where F Ψ = {F S × × i∈I Ω Ψ,i }. The inductive step is to let for any events F and G, any i ∈ I and r ∈ [0, 1] the sets ¬F , F ∧ G, B i r F and A i F also be events. For the results of this section, it is not necessary that a set in Ω be an event. For sets of the form E = Ψ⊇Ξ E Ψ , define the base space as the coarsest space containing some element of E, i.e. Ω(E) = Ω Ξ for the preceding E. Applying the belief operator to a set of this form results in another set of this form with the same base space, as shown in Lemma 3. The same holds for the awareness operator by Remark 1, and for negation and conjunction by definition. 
r E) Ψ for any Ψ , otherwise t would put probability one on B i r E. But t ∈ supp g i (t) implies g i (t ) = g i (t), so if t does not put probability at least r on any section of E, then neither does t.
r E) Ψ for some Ψ . Any t ∈ (B i r E) Ψ , therefore any t ∈ supp g i (t), satisfies g i (t )(E Ξ ) ≥ r for some Ξ . Since g i (t) = g i (t ), the same condition is satisfied by t. So t ∈ (B 
The latter implication is strengthened to equality in the next proposition, which demonstrates that the universal type space with unawareness satisfies the AU introspection property of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998). 
The next section demonstrates that the desirable properties of unawareness and certainty are satisfied in the universal type space with unawareness, while unawareness is nontrivial. Therefore the model of this paper escapes the impossibility result of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998). Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) Every unawareness model must deal with the limitations imposed by the result of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) , which states that standard state spaces preclude unawareness. In this section it is shown that the universal type space with unawareness is not a standard state space model according to the definition of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini and permits nontrivial unawareness. First, an overview of the impossibility result is in order. Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) . There is a knowledge operator K and an unawareness operator U on a state space Ω. The model has a single agent. The axioms described below are imposed on a state space model and the following theorem is proved.
Bypassing the impossibility result of

Overview of
Theorem 8 (Theorem 1 of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini). A4-A6, A1 imply U (E) = ∅ (never unaware). A4-A6, A2 imply U (E) ⊆ ¬K(F ) (unawareness means no knowledge of anything).
Proof. U (E) ⊆ U U (E) ⊆ ¬K¬KU (E) = ¬K(Ω). A1 is K(Ω) = Ω, A2 implies ¬K(Ω) ⊆ ¬K(F ).
The preceding theorem applies to set-based models, but using a propositional model does not necessarily permit nontrivial unawareness, as the next theorem shows. The notation for a propositional model uses formulas φ, ψ, and redefines the knowledge and unawareness operators to map formulas to formulas. The function · : Φ → 2 Ω gives for each φ the set of states in which φ is true. The additional axioms on propositional models are as follows.
A7 (real states): φ = Ω \ ¬φ , φ ∨ ¬φ = Ω A8 (event sufficiency): φ = ψ implies Kφ = Kψ and U φ = U ψ A9 (weak necessitation): ¬U φ ⊆ K(φ ∨ ¬φ) , equivalently ¬U (E) ⊆ K(Ω). Under A7 and A8, a propositional model can be expressed as a standard state space model by setting K(E) = Kφ and U (E) = U φ for any φ with φ = E, so Theorem 8 applies. The following theorem uses slightly weaker axioms than Theorem 8 and proves a similar result.
Theorem 9 (Theorem 2 of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini). A4-A9 imply U (E) = U (F ) ⊆ ¬K(G).
Proof. By Theorem 8, U (E) ⊆ ¬K(Ω). A9 gives ¬K(Ω) ⊆ U (F ), so U (E) ⊆ U (F ). A4 gives U (G) ⊆ ¬K(G).
The next subsection shows that the universal type space with unawareness satisfies the properties of knowledge and unawareness considered natural in Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) , while containing nontrivial unawareness.
4.2.
Connection to type spaces with unawareness. To discuss the theorems of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) in the model of this paper, pick any agent i and take knowledge to mean i's belief with probability one, KE = B i 1 E. Unawareness is the negation of awareness for that agent, U E = ¬A i E. There are two possible interpretations of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini's state space Ω in a type space with unawareness-the whole type space Ω or a collection {Ω Ψ : Ψ ⊇ Ξ} for some Ξ. Necessitation holds under the first interpretation, but not necessarily under the second, since for Ξ ⊂ Ξ, types in Ω Ξ do not form beliefs about any Ω Ψ with Ψ ⊇ Ξ.
Monotonicity holds in type spaces with unawareness, because a given type needs weakly more awareness to reason about E ⇒ F than about F and puts weakly less probability on E. If E has probability one for a type, then the type is aware of F and puts probability one on F .
The first part of plausibility, ¬A i E ⇒ ¬B i 1 E, follows from Equations (1) and (2) defining belief and awareness. The second part, ¬A i E ⇒ ¬B i 1 ¬B i 1 E, is implied by Proposition 7. The KU introspection property is exactly Lemma 6 in subsection 3. AU introspection follows from Proposition 5, which actually gives equality instead of a subset relation.
The crucial property of the universal type space with unawareness is the failure of the real states axiom of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) -the negation of an event is generally not equal to the complement of the event, and tautologies E ∨ ¬E that use the nonstandard negation do not equal the whole Ω. Since the belief and awareness operators in the universal space are set-based, they satisfy the event sufficiency axiom.
Weak necessitation is implied by necessitation, so it holds under the interpretation that equates Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini's state space with the whole type space. Under the interpretation that makes the state space correspond to {Ω Ψ : Ψ ⊇ Ξ} for some Ξ, weak necessitation may hold, even though necessitation fails. It depends on the particular Ξ chosen. The natural choice, based on the ¬U φ ⊆ K(φ ∨ ¬φ) version of weak necessitation, is to set Ξ equal to the base space of the event considered, i.e. to write the second version of weak necessitation as ¬U (E) ⊆ K(E ∨ ¬E). This makes weak necessitation hold.
The properties of knowledge and unawareness that Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini considered desirable (plausibility, KU introspection and AU introspection) are satisfied in the model of this paper. Of the additional properties they considered, monotonicity and event sufficiency hold unconditionally, while necessitation and weak necessitation hold under some interpretations, but not others. The impossibility theorems of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) fail due to the failure of the real states assumption-as was argued in section 3, unawareness and belief are nontrivial.
The mechanism by which the universal type space of this paper achieves nontrivial unawareness is the same as in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) . The next section is devoted to comparing the universal space to Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper's model. Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) 5.1. Overview of Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) . There is a lattice of state spaces ∪ α∈L Ω α . The indexes of the lattice are here taken to be subsets of Φ to show the embedding into the universal type space with unawareness more easily. Any lattice can be embedded in the power set of some set, so relaxing the simplifying assumption will also result in an embedding of the lattice in the universal space.
Comparison to
The state spaces have the lattice ordering. If Ω α carries less awareness than Ω β , this is denoted Ω α ≤ Ω β or equivalently α ≤ β. For each pair Ω α ≤ Ω β , there is a projection operator ρ β α : Ω β → Ω α , and projections satisfy ρ
For any set E ⊆ Ω α , the set of inverse projections of E into higher spaces is E ↑= ∪ β≥α (ρ β α )
−1 E. The agents are permitted to reason only about events-sets of the form E ↑ for some subset E of some Ω α .
The negation of an event is nonstandard, ¬E ↑= ∪ β≥α (ρ
Conjunction is standard. Disjunction is derived from negation and conjunction by De Morgan's laws.
There are knowledge and awareness operators for each agent i, denoted K i and A i . The knowledge operator for each agent is derived from that agent's possibility correspondence Π i , which maps each state to a possibility set in a weakly lower state space, Π i (ω β ) ⊆ Ω α for some α ≤ β. The definition of knowledge is standard, K i E = {ω : Π(ω) ⊆ E}, and awareness is defined as
The following restrictions are imposed on the possibility correspondence in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) 
Since awareness is defined from knowledge, if projections preserve knowledge, then they preserve awareness, i.e. restriction (v) implies (iii).
5.2.
Connecting the lattice of spaces to the universal type space. The possibility correspondence of Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) translates to the support of the type function in the present paper: Π i (ω) = supp g i (t) for t corresponding to ω. Based on this, knowledge translates to belief with probability one, and awareness translates to awareness.
Stationarity in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) corresponds to, but is weaker than, the agent's certainty of his belief in the universal space, t ∈ supp g i (t) ⇒ g i (t ) = g i (t). This is because certainty of belief applies to beliefs with all probabilities, while stationarity only applies to probability one belief.
To compare the other restrictions of Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) to the present paper, projections of types must be defined in the universal type space with unawareness. I begin by defining the inverse projections of sections of events. Recall that an event is Ψ⊇Ξ E Ψ for some Ξ ⊆ Φ and events are inductively defined from measurable sets in S. For each E Ψ and Ψ ⊇ Ψ, define (ρ
. Abusing notation, write {t} as t. For each Ξ and type t ∈ Ω Ξ , consider all events F satisfying Ω(F ) = Ω Ξ and t ∈ F (same as t ∈ F Ω(F ) ). For all Ψ ⊇ Ξ, define (ρ
−1 F Ξ (this does not require singletons to be measurable). If the Ξ-section of F is nonempty, then for all Ψ ⊇ Ξ the Ψ-section is nonempty as well, so
Projections are defined the obvious way from inverse projections: ρ
Lemma 10 shows that these are well defined, i.e. nonempty and disjoint for different types.
Lemma 10. For all t ∈ Ω Ψ and all Ξ ⊆ Ψ there is a t in Ω Ξ satisfying t ∈ (ρ
Proof. For the first claim, ∧ t ∈E E = ∅, therefore ∧ Ω(E)=ΩΞ, t ∈E E = ∅ and for any t ∈ ∧ Ω(E)=ΩΞ, t ∈E E it is true that t ∈ (ρ Ψ Ξ ) −1 t. In the construction of the universal type space with unawareness in (Viglizzo, 2005, Theorem 7 .1) that this paper uses, types are collections of events, so if t = t , then there is some E such that t ∈ E and t / ∈ E. Therefore the intersection of the collection of events to which t belongs does not contain any t = t.
The generalized reflexivity property of Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) translates to: for t ∈ Ω Ψ and supp
. This generally does not hold in the universal type space with unawareness, as it implies the truth axiom K i E ⇒ E, or in terms of belief,
The translation of projections preserving ignorance is (ρ
The restriction that projections preserve knowledge corresponds to projections preserving beliefs, which holds in the universal space by Proposition 11. Preserving beliefs is a stronger property than preserving knowledge, as it restricts beliefs with all probabilities, not just certainty. Together with stationarity it implies that projections preserve ignorance.
Proof. By the definition of projections in the universal space with unawareness, t = ρ
So if t believes something, t believes it also. The converse fails if t has more awareness than t . However,
−1 E Ξ still holds, because the base space of E
is Ω Ξ , which makes both t and t = ρ Ψ Ξ t aware of E. Taking knowledge to correspond to belief with probability one, all the conditions satisfied by the model of the present paper are satisfied by the lattice of state spaces of Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) . If the knowledge operator in the lattice is extended to probabilistic belief in a consistent way, as is done in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) , the resulting model can be embedded in the universal type space with unawareness.
Under the restrictions on Π i outlined above, Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) bypasses the Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) impossibility result, while the natural properties of knowledge and awareness-plausibility, AU and KU introspection-are satisfied. In light of section 4 and the connection between this paper and Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper's model, this is not surprising, because the model of this paper satisfies plausibility, AU and KU introspection and has nontrivial unawareness.
Conclusion and potential extensions
This paper proved the existence of the universal type space with unawareness for fixed sets of awareness levels, states of nature, and players. The universal space for all sets of awareness levels (or all kinds of unawareness) is unlikely to exist, since similarly to knowledge, awareness is a discontinuous operator. The nonexistence of a universal space was proved for knowledge in Heifetz and Samet (1998a) and for general information structures in Meier (2005) .
The unawareness in the universal type space does not have to be propositionally generated, as in this paper. The same proof of existence and characterization of events, and similar properties of belief and awareness would hold if the awareness levels were subsets J of the finite set I of agents. In that case, an agent could reason only about the agents he is aware of, their reasoning about the agents he is aware of etc.
Bounded reasoning in the style of Kets (2010) can be expressed by taking the awareness levels to be initial segments of N ∪ {∞}. An agent can reason about the k-th and lower order beliefs of other agents, their reasoning about k-th and lower orders etc. The proof of existence of the universal space in Viglizzo (2005) and Moss and Viglizzo (2006) only deals with a finite number of agents, and mathematically the fixed set of awareness levels in this paper behaves like the set of agents. With bounded reasoning, the set of awareness levels is N ∪ ∞, therefore countably infinite. However, since all the proofs of Moss and Viglizzo (2006) use measurable spaces and the assumption about a finite number of agents is only used to make showing measurability easier, the proofs work with a countable number of awareness levels as well.
3 The events and the belief and awareness operators would have a similar structure to section 3 if the awareness levels were orders of reasoning.
If the existence result holds for several kinds of unawareness, it also holds for their combination, with only notational changes in the proof. Type spaces with unawareness can be taken to consist of measurable spaces M Ψ,J,k,i for each agent i and set of awareness levels indexed by a set of propositions Ψ ⊆ Ψ, a set of agents J ⊆ I and an order of reasoning k. Each type in M Ψ,J,k,i can reason only about the agents in J and propositions in Ψ, and the reasoning can extend only up to order k.
The universal type space with unawareness was constructed as a set-based model. An equivalent formulation would use modal logic, replacing events with formulas. The logic for probability and awareness would be a combination of the logic of awareness of Fagin and Halpern (1988) or Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2008) and the probability logic of Meier (2001) or Zhou (2009) . Expressing the above results in a propositional notation would mostly be a matter of switching symbols.
A genuine extension of this paper would be to add quantification to the model, enabling the agents to express belief in the existence of unawareness without knowing exactly what they are unaware of. Quantification has been added to the logic of knowledge and awareness by , so in the modal logic framework the universal type space with quantification and unawareness would combine one of these with Meier (2001 ) or Zhou (2009 . In a set-based model quantification is difficult to express, since it is similar to conjunction of all events in a given class, but conjunction is a separate operator with a different interpretation. With an uncountable number of events, it is difficult to make arbitrary conjunctions of events measurable, so adding quantification to a model with probabilities is technically complex.
In games with unawareness, agents must believe in the existence of unawareness in order to generate novel predictions about behavior. Agents unaware of their unawareness act as if they were in a smaller game. Combining their behavior into a solution concept may be challenging, but from an agent's viewpoint the game is standard. For this reason, universal type spaces with self-aware unawareness, i.e. with quantification added to the model, are desirable.
Universal spaces of preference hierarchies along the lines of Epstein and Wang (1996) ; Bergemann, Morris, and Takahashi (2011); Gül and Pesendorfer (2010) can be constructed using the methods of this paper, since the preference spaces closely resemble belief spaces. A slight modification of the main theorem of Viglizzo (2005) can be used to prove the existence of a universal space for purely measurable utility functions, and an extension of Doberkat and Schubert (2011) will give the result in the Polish space framework.
Unawareness can be added to preference type spaces the same way as it has been added to universal belief type spaces in this paper. Preference spaces with unawareness provide the same foundation for games with unawareness as the preference spaces in the literature provide for standard games. Applications include axiomatizing solution concepts, distinguishing strategic generosity from true generosity and studying strategic distinguishability in games with unawareness.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
To prove the existence of a universal type space with awareness using Viglizzo (2005) , the problem is restated in category-theoretic terms, as in Moss (2011) . The following concepts from category theory are needed.
A category is a directed graph consisting of objects (nodes) and morphisms (arrows). In this paper, only the category Meas PΦ×I0 , consisting of vectors of measurable spaces as objects and vectors of measurable functions as morphisms, is needed. A functor V : Meas PΦ×I0 → Meas PΦ×I0 maps each object M ∈ Meas PΦ×I0 to an object V (M ) ∈ Meas PΦ×I0 and each morphism f : M → M to a morphism V (f ) : V (M ) → V (M ), preserving compositions of morphisms, so V (f • g) = V (f ) • V (g).
A coalgebra (M, g) for a functor V : Meas PΦ×I0 → Meas PΦ×I0 is a vector of measurable spaces M and a vector of measurable functions g : M → V (M ). A coalgebra morphism from (M , g ) to (M, g) is a morphism f : M → M that satisfies g•f = V (f )•g . A final coalgebra for V is one that has a unique coalgebra morphism from all coalgebras of V into it. The type spaces of Heifetz and Samet (1998b) are coalgebras for the functor F : Meas I → Meas I , defined as F (M ) = (∆(S × M −i )) i∈I , and the universal type space is a final coalgebra of F (Moss, 2011) .
The next two lemmas characterize the type spaces with propositional unawareness as coalgebras of a certain functors in Meas PΦ×I0 . The proof of Theorem 1 follows.
Lemma 12. A type space with propositional unawareness and awareness levels indexed by PΦ is a coalgebra for the functor V : Meas PΦ×I0 → Meas PΦ×I0 defined as V = (V Ψ,i ) i∈I0 Ψ⊆Φ , where for i ∈ I, V Ψ,i (M ) = Ξ⊆Ψ ∆(M Ξ,−i ) and V Ψ,0 (M ) = M Ψ,0 (the identity on the 0 component of M ).
Proof. By Definition 1, a type space with awareness is an (object, morphism) pair (M, g) in Meas PΦ×I0 , where the morphism g maps the object M to another object V (M ) = ( Ξ⊆Ψ ∆(M Ξ,−i )) i∈I0 Ψ⊆Φ in Meas PΦ×I0 . So g maps M to its image under the functor V . Therefore (M, g) is a coalgebra for the functor.
Lemma 13. Coalgebra morphisms are type morphisms. Final coalgebras are universal type spaces.
In the Polish space framework and without unawareness, this result is (Pintér, 2010, Corollary 2.8) . The proof in the measurable space framework and with awareness does not differ significantly, but is presented below for completeness.
Proof. Coalgebra morphisms in Meas
PΦ×I0 and type morphisms are vectors of measurable functions. A coalgebra morphism f : M → M for the functor V satisfies g • f = V (f ) • g , meaning that for each m ∈ M , the same element of V (M ) results from applying g • f as from V (f ) • g .
Two elements (µ Ψ,i ) i∈I0 Ψ⊆Φ and (µ Ψ,i ) i∈I0 Ψ⊆Φ of V (M ) are equal if for each Ψ ⊆ Φ, µ Ψ,0 = µ Ψ,0 , for each i ∈ I, supp µ Ψ,i ⊆ M Ξ ⊇ supp µ Ψ,i and for all E ∈ Σ(M Ξ,−i ), the probability µ i (E) is the same as µ i (E). This is exactly the condition for a type morphism in Definition 2, so the definitions of a coalgebra morphism for V and a type morphism are the same.
By Lemma 12, type spaces are coalgebras for functors of the form V (M ) = (∆(M Ψ,−i )) i∈I Ψ⊆Φ . The definition of a universal type space is that there exists a unique type morphism from any type space into it, and the definition of a final coalgebra is that there exists a unique coalgebra morphism from any coalgebra into it. Since type morphisms are coalgebra morphisms, universal type spaces are final coalgebras.
Proof of Theorem 1. According to Viglizzo (2005, Theorem 7 .1), any functor on Meas I composed of ∆, Cartesian products, disjoint unions, the identity, constant functors and projections from Meas I to Meas has a final coalgebra. Viglizzo's proof remains unchanged if the functor is on Meas PΦ×I0 and projections from Meas PΦ×I0 to Meas are used. Since the functor in Lemma 12 satisfies the conditions, there exists a final coalgebra for it, which by Lemma 13 is the universal type space.
Suppose there are two final coalgebras (Ω, g) and (Ω , g ). There is a unique morphism from any coalgebra to (Ω, g) and to (Ω , g ), in particular the morphisms φ : Ω → Ω , ψ : Ω → Ω, id Ω : Ω → Ω and id Ω : Ω → Ω are unique. Then ψ • φ = id Ω and φ • ψ = id Ω by uniqueness, so φ = ψ −1 is an isomorphism. Any two final coalgebras are isomorphic.
By Viglizzo (2005, Theorem 2. 3), the morphism g in a final coalgebra is an isomorphism. This result in the Polish space framework is (Pintér, 2010, Corollary 2.9) .
